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ABSTRACT

Reflexives in Japanese and English show a number of interesting differences. Morphologically, there is a single form "jibun" ("jishin") in Japanese, which does not vary for person or number. In English there are various forms which always agree in person and number ("myself," "himself," "themselves," etc.). Syntactically, English reflexives are usually restricted to the same clause as their antecedents, while Japanese reflexives are not. With numerous examples in Japanese and English, the uses of reflexives are analyzed and compared. (Author/CHK)

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REFLEXIVE FORMS IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH[1]

Kenji Hirakouji
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Reflexives in Japanese and English show a number of quite interesting differences. Morphologically, there is a single form jibun (jishin) in Japanese, which does not vary for person or number (though some Japanese pronominal forms do). In English of course there are various forms which always must agree in those categories: myself, himself, themselves, oneself and so on. Syntactically, English reflexives are usually restricted to the same clause as their antecedents, while Japanese reflexives are not. We begin with some discussion of Japanese examples, and then pass on to corresponding English structures.

Typical of Japanese reflexives are the object noun phrases in sentences (1) to (3).

(1) a. Watashi-wa {watashi / jibun} -jishin-ga wakar-anai.
b. I-subj {me / self} -self-obj understand-neg.
c. Watashi-wa jibun-ga wakar-anai.
d. *Watashi-wa jishin-ga wakar-anai.
I don't understand myself.

(2) a. Kare-wa {kare / jibun} -jishin-ga wakar-anai.
b. he-subj {him / self} -self-obj understand-neg
c. Kare-wa jibun-ga wakar-anai.
d. *K[illegible]-wa jishin-ga wakar-anai.
He doesn't understand himself.

(3) a. John-wa {?John / kare / jibun} -jishin-ga wakar-anai.
a'
b.

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John-subj {John / him / self} -self-obj understand-neg.

c. John-wa jibun-ga wakar-anai.

d. *John-wa jishin-ga wakar-anai.

John doesn't understand himself.

S.-Y. Kuroda (1966, ch. V) entertains two alternative analyses of a set of similar examples.[2] In one of these, jishin is regarded as the 'marker' of reflexivization, obligatorily introduced by grammatical rule into the later of two noun phrases which meet certain conditions including 'identity'. Then the marked noun phrase may be replaced by jibun, and jishin deleted. Kuroda's informal statement of these rules is as follows.

Analysis A

I Noun X Noun → Noun X Noun+jishin

II Noun+jishin → jibun+jishin (optional)

III jishin → ∅ (optional)

Even though Analysis A accounts neatly for the obvious paraphrase among the respective a, b and c sentences in (1) to (3), Kuroda rejects it in favor of another analysis which separates jishin and jibun both semantically and syntactically.

> The form jibun is taken to be a token of the reflexive marker, while the form jishin is taken to be a token of the emphatic or distinguishing marker. Thus, jishin is to be introduced from the beginning in the basic forms, while jibun will be introduced transformationally.[3]

The three rules of Analysis A are replaced by a single rule as indicated.

Analysis B

IV Noun X Noun → Noun X jibun

Kuroda offers two grounds for preferring Analysis B: one semantic and one syntactic. He cites the following examples.

(4) a. George-wa {George / jibun} -jishin-ga shi-tai toki-ni shigoto-o suru

b. George-subj {George / self} -self-subj do-want time-at work-obj do

c. George-wa jibun-ga shi-tai toki-ni shigoto-o suru.

e. George-wa shi-tai toki-ni shigoto-o suru.
George does his work when he feels like doing it.

(5) a. John-wa Bill-ga{John / *jibun}-jishin-o mita toki hon-o yonde-ita
b. John-subj Bill-subj{John / self}-self-obj saw time book-obj reading-was

c. *John-wa Bill-ga jibun-o mita toki hon-o yonde-ita.

e. John-wa Bill-ga mita toki hon-o yonde-ita.
John was reading a book when Bill saw him.

In (4) and (5), the reflexive forms are inside subordinate time adverbial clauses with respect to their antecedents. They are thus structures where reflexives cannot appear in English. The (e) sentences do not contain reflexives in Japanese either; we will assume with Kuroda that they contain anaphoric pronouns, which are normally without phonetic shape in Japanese. Of course the readings given are not unique in this case. The subject of shi-tai in (4c) and the object of mita in (5e) could possibly refer outside the sentences, with readings like George does the work when I want to for (4e), or John was reading a book when Bill saw her for (5e).

Kuroda claims that jishin is associated with a clear 'emphatic implication' in (4ab) and (5a) which is not present in (4ce) or (5e). In fact he glosses differentially in the following way.

(4a) George does his work when George-self feels like doing it.
(4b) George does his work when he himself feels like doing it.
(5a) John was reading a book when Bill saw John-self.

Since these glosses for (4a) and (5a) are not really English (as Kuroda is well aware of course), we might suggest as alternatives the following.

(4a") George does his work when George himself feels like doing it.
(5a") ?John was reading a book when Bill saw John himself.

Kuroda further claims that jishin may occur in positions where reflexives may not, as in (5a) versus (5bc). Sentences (5bc) are ungrammatical of course only under the intended antecedent relation; they are perfectly normal if Bill is taken as antecedent with the reading John was reading a book when Bill saw himself.

The case for Analysis B over Analysis A thus depends on two rather questionable intuitions. First there is the semantic judgment that (4c)

is closer in meaning to (4c) than it is to (4b). Kuroda says merely that in (4c) 'the emphatic implication is not obvious'. Neither is it particularly obvious to us that such a meaning is lacking. Second there is the syntactic judgment that jishin may occur with a noun phrase like John in the object position of a time adverbial clause as in (5a), though reflexivization is blocked there. Kuroda says merely that (5a) 'should probably be taken as grammatical'. It seems to us that (5a) is ungrammatical, just as is its English gloss (5a"). We are unsure even about sentences (3a) and (4a); they seem acceptable only under strong contrast on the noun phrases with jishin. Reduction to a pronoun as in (3a'), or to jibun as in (3b) and (4b) is preferred by most speakers we consulted, and obligatory for some.

Yet in spite of doubts about these particular judgments, Kuroda's general points that (i) jishin may occur independently of reflexivization and (ii) jishin has a distinct meaning of its own, are surely correct. That is immediately clear from examples like (6) and (7).

(6) John-ga iku.
John-subj go
John goes.

(7) John-jishin-ga iku.
John-self-subj go
John himself goes. (or) John goes himself.

The jishin in (7) can have nothing to do with any reflexivization rule involving two noun phrases; there is but one noun phrase in the sentence. And it certainly contributes a difference in meaning between (6) and (7), though we might question whether the term 'emphasis' is very helpful as a description of what that difference is. These points seems quite decisive against Rule I of Analysis A. One might want to regard the jishin which occurs with jibun as a different word from that in (7), but there is no independent basis for such a separation, and it would seem to entail the loss of a real generalization.

At the same time, the case for Analysis B is far from made; there remains to be considered whether (iii) reflexivization may occur independently of jishin either semantically or syntactically. Such a claim seems to be false. Let us investigate its implications for some other examples.

(8) a. Mary-wa {?Mary / jibun} -jishin-ga kodomo-o mite yorokonda.
b. Mary-subj {Mary / self} -self-subj child-obj seeing was-happy

c. Mary-wa jibun-ga kodomo-o mite yorokonda.
Mary was happy to see the child herself.

d. *Mary-wa Mary-ga kodomo-o mite yorokonda.

e. Mary-wa kodomo-o mite yorokonda.

Mary was happy to see the child.

Kuroda's Analysis B would derive (8b) from (8a) and (8c) from (8d) by by Rule IV. A similar pronominalization rule would derive (8e) from (8d). Yet the meaning of (8c), much more clearly than was the case with the (4) sentences, is virtually identical with (8b) and quite different from (8e). Thus Kuroda's rule fails to account for a paraphrase relation and introduces a clear semantic contrast vis an optional transformation.[4] Analysis A is preferable here, as it will derive (8c) from (8b) by Rule III.

A similar situation obtains in thematized sentences, as the following examples demonstrate.

(9) a. b. John-wa {*John / jibun}-jishin-ga ik-anai.

John-theme {John / self}-self-subj go-neg

c. John-wa jibun-ga ik-anai.

As for John, he doesn't go himself.

d. *John-wa John-ga ik-anai.

e. John-wa ik-anai.

As for John, he doesn't go.

We assume a thematization rule which derives such sentences from structures like (6) and (7) (with the negative element added). The rule copies a noun phrase, in this case the subject, into theme position; intermediate structures like (9ad) result. Then pronominalization or reflexivization apply as in (8). If we do thematization without copying (as Kuroda does), then of course the appearance of jibun in examples like (9bc) is quite inexplicable. From (9ad) to (9ce), the identical arguments apply that we gave for (8), and the same conclusion follows.

A significant variation occurs with jitai, the inanimate counterpart of jishin.

(10) Alcohol-ga mondai da.

alcohol-subj problem is

Alcohol is the problem.

(11) Alcohol-jitai-ga mondai da.
alcohol-self-subj problem is
Alcohol itself is the problem.

(12) a. Alcohol-wa {*alcohol / sore}-jitai-ga mondai da.
b.

c. *Alcohol-wa sore-ga mondai da.
As for alcohol, it is itself the problem.

d. *Alcohol-wa alcohol-ga mondai da.

e. Alcohol-wa mondai da.
As for alcohol, it is the problem.

Unlike the opposition jishin/jitai, there is no inanimate counterpart of jibun. Sore in (12b) is not itself a reflexive form, but a demonstrative with pronominal function. Perhaps because of this, Rule III never applies to jitai; thus (12c) cannot be grammatical. To account for (12b), Kuroda will be obliged to extend his reflexivization rule appropriately. If reflexivization is independent of jishin or jitai, the absence of (12c) cannot be accounted for.

Of course what is shown by the sentences in (12) is rather that reflexivization is dependent on 'emphatic' forms like jishin and jitai. This is clear also from (3a'), which we reproduce here for convenience, and (13) and (16).

(3a') John-wa kare-jishin-ga wakar-anai.
John doesn't understand himself.

(13) John-wa kare-ga wakar-anai.
John doesn't understand him.

(14) John-wa wakar-anai.
John doesn't understand him.

(15) John-wa kare-jishin-ga ik-anai.
As for John, he himself doesn't go.

(16) *John-wa kare-ga ik-anai.

Normally, neither the zero anaphoric pronoun in (14), nor the 'emphatic' pronoun kare in (13) and (16) can be understood as coreferential to another noun phrase in the same clause. In (3a'), however, the reflexive reading is possible, and in fact the most likely in isolation. In (15)

it is the only possible one. Thus jishin, like jitai, can by itself affect the understood coreference relationships in Japanese sentences.

The analysis which seems to us most satisfactory is a blend of Kuroda's A and B. We agree that the 'emphatic' forms jishin and jitai can neither be predicted on the basis of other formal properties of the structures they occur in, nor attached at random to noun phrases. But we retain optional rules introducing jibun (like II) and deleting jishin (like III). In the following 'J' represents jishin or jitai, and the rules are presented in conformity with Kuroda's model used earlier.

Analysis C

I' Noun X Noun+J → Noun X Noun+J
[+pro]

II' Noun+jishin → jibun+jishin (optional)
[+pro]

III' jibun+jishin → jibun (optional)

Here Rule I' is really a special case of the pronominalization rule; II' is a kind of backward spread of the reflexive feature, and III' is a kind of redundancy deletion contingent upon II'.

Rule I' is vacuous in cases like (1) and (2) where the noun phrase is already a pronoun. It is to be regarded as normally obligatory, but in some circumstances (to the extent that sentences like (3a) and (4a) are grammatical), it may be optional or overrideable. There are of course additional conditions to be specified--identity between the two noun phrases, and an interpretation of the variable X. It might seem from (5) that the interpretation of X ought to include Kuroda's condition that reflexivization cannot go into the object position in a time adverbial. Thus (5b) cannot result from (5a) via (5a').

(5) a. / a' / b. John-wa Bill-ga { John / *kare / *jibun } -jishin-o mita toki hon-o yonde-ita.

John was reading a book when Bill saw John himself.

In our view, the restriction is not on Rule I', but rather on the occurrence of jishin, and a reflection of semantic conditions on its use that we are not in a position to clarify here. It is really (5a), the putative abstract structure, which is ungrammatical; there should be *'s on (5a) and also on the English gloss.

The feature [+pro] assigned by Rule I' also requires some comment. As has been noted already, there are two sorts of pronouns in Japanese:

overt ones like watashi 'I' and kare 'he', and the zero pronoun (or deleted pronoun). Kuroda's discussion of pronouns (1966, ch. IV) is insightful. Generally speaking, the overt pronouns are used only when definite contrast exists, or they are necessary to the intended meaning. Otherwise, the zero pronoun is used. The zero pronoun, however, can never result from I'. This is a special case of a general restriction--no noun phrase with J can be pronominalized to zero, regardless of the source of [+pro]. This restriction presumably follows from the 'emphatic' meaning of J. Thus we assume (i) that [+pro] characterizes all pronouns, (ii) that independent factors determine which particular pronominal forms appear where (speech level is another such factor), and (iii) that Rule I' need say no more than that a certain noun phrase is pronominalized.

It is possible to regard Rule II' as an analog of zero pronominalization. Like the zero pronoun, jibun neutralizes the formal contrasts of the overt pronouns. Though we have listed II' as optional, it is clearly preferred in most situations. The precise conditions on its operation are unclear, but it is not totally restricted to the output of I'; there are examples of jibun occurring without an antecedent.

(17) a. {Jibun-jishin / b. Jibun} -ga yuki-nasai
{self-self / self} -subj go-imp
Go yourself.

(18) a. Jibun-ga iku.
I'll go myself.

(19) a. Jibun-ga iku no?
Do I [have to] go myself?

(20) Anata, jibun-ga iku no?
Darling, do you [have to] go yourself?

Such operation of II' is not totally free, however. Like the zero pronoun, jibun can not be used where a significant contrast would be lost; this is more often the case where there is no antecedent.

We have also listed Rule III' as optional, even though there seem to be cases where it is virtually obligatory, particularly where the reflexive forms lack an antecedent.

(18) b. ?Jibun-jishin-ga iku.

(19) b. ?Jibun-jishin-ga iku no?

Although we have argued throughout, in part on semantic grounds, that jibun is always derived from jibun-jishin, we do not wish to claim that Rule III' has no semantic effect at all. On the contrary, there does seem to be a detectable difference between some pairs of sentences which are related by it, say (4bc), (8bc) or (17ab), in the intensity of the 'emphasis'. However, we see no way to capture this nuance as a structural property of the sentences in question, and are content to regard it as a matter of surface interpretation.

There is a probable reason why Kuroda did not consider an analysis like the one we have proposed. It may be due to his acceptance of a grammatical theory in which abstract structures are generated by phrase structure rules. For him, noun phrases are specified by the phrase structure rules, and therefore those rules also determine which pairs of noun phrases are identical.[5] He argued plausibly that jishin also ought to be introduced by phrase structure rules. Given that for Japanese reflexivization the relevant pairs of identical noun phrases might be separated by arbitrarily complex structure, there is no way to make sure that the second of each such pair is always accompanied by jishin. That is, there is no way to avoid producing abstract structures like (20).

(20) *John-wa John-ga wakar-anai.

Now (20) is ungrammatical as a surface structure. It cannot be reflexivized, since that would require jishin. Nor can it be pronominalized: (13) and (14) exist, but they cannot mean what (20) would mean. There is no other known mechanism in Japanese grammar which would account for the ungrammaticality of (20).

This problem is in part an artifact of the theory of phrase structure rules. What we want to say is that structures like (20) are ill-formed from the beginning. If phrase structure rules do not allow us to say this, then so much the worse for phrase structure rules. Even without this problem, of course, a phrase structure rule introduction of J is dubious. Even though jishin and jitai have a meaning, that meaning is not freely addable to any noun phrase, as we have already had occasion to note, and will see in more detail presently. The constraints governing the appearance of J seem to be semantic in a way that is completely irrelevant to phrase structure properties, either abstract or derived. We must confess, finally, that we have no useful understanding of what it is that makes possible the choice of J, and in particular why J is obligatorily introduced into a structure like (20). What is worthy of note, however, is that the dilemma of (20) arises only when the identical noun phrases are within the same clause.[6] As we have already seen in (4) and (8), when the noun phrases are in different clauses, both reflexivization and ordinary pronominalization are possible. This shows that the supposed fundamental difference between Japanese and English with respect to the syntactic domain of reflexivization is slightly misleading. In order to develop the parallelism, we must now turn our attention to English reflexives.

In English, the so-called reflexive pronouns seem to serve two functions: they indicate reflexive actions or relations as in (21) and (22), and they indicate 'emphasis' or 'intensification' as in (23) and (24).

(21) Sally pinched herself.

(22) I don't understand myself.

(23) Sally herself will go.

(24) I myself can't understand it.

The classical analysis of English reflexives by Lees and Klima (1963) gave an account of sentences like (21) and (22), but declined (in a footnote) to relate them to sentences like (23) and (24). Most subsequent studies of English reflexives have, unfortunately, followed this lead, usually without a footnote. The tacit claim behind such an approach would seem to be that the occurrence of the same forms in the two types of sentences is an accident of English grammar, perhaps explicable hi torically but of no real significance or interest. But as our discussion of Japanese should have made clear already, such a claim is very suspicious. The possibility should at least be explored that the relationship between the two uses of reflexive pronouns is a basic one.

The only previous proposal attempting such a connection that we are aware of is along the following lines. There is a rule reduplicating English noun phrases with the semantic feature of 'emphasis'. This rule precedes reflexivization, which then turns the second of each pair of reduplicated (and therefore identical) noun phrases into the appropriate reflexive pronoun. It is alleged that reduplication is a 'natural' manifestation of 'emphasis'.[7] The analysis is difficult to criticize directly. One can point out that reduplication is otherwise scarce in English; that 'emphasis' is too vague a characterization of the semantics of the construction; or that the glib appeal to naturalness is empty. But the real objection must be that the analysis really gets us nowhere. It certainly won't generalize to the facts in Japanese. Worse, nothing follows from it in English. It is entirely in the spirit of the Lees and Klima approach--a trivial footnote to English grammar. Once more in the light of our investigation of Japanese, we can suggest the major problem: this analysis derives the 'emphatic' reflexives via the 'ordinary' reflexives; what needs to be tried is to reverse the direction of derivation.

Before we offer our own proposal, we will explore briefly some of the behavior of 'emphatic' reflexives. Consider first the following sentences, in each of which one might legitimately describe the noun phrase Sally as 'emphasized'.

(25) Sally will go.

(26) Only Sally will go.

(27) Sally also will go.

(28) Sally will go also.

(29) Even Sally will go.

(30) Sally will go even.

(31) Sally herself will go.

(32) Sally will go herself.

Our claim is that the 'emphatic' reflexives are best understood as manifestations of a 'quantifier-like' element (to be called J in conformity with our discussion of Japanese) which falls into a group with only, also and even.

One thing which suggests this grouping is the awkwardness resulting from multiplication of such elements.

(33) ?Only Sally hates only Bill.

(34) ?Sally also hates Bill also.

(35) ?Even Sally hates even Bill.

(36) ?Sally herself hates Bill himself.

Kuroda (1966, ch. I) erected this into a grammatical restriction to one of each such element per sentence.[8] While this seems too rigid a position, neither is it true that more than one of each is very happy within a single sentence. Whether the effect is semantic or syntactic, it must still be accounted for at some point. There is in addition a difference which ought to be noted. Only, also and even can be applied to various syntactic constituents, whereas J (at least when manifested as a reflexive pronoun) is only applied to noun phrases.

(37) Sally will only go.

(38) Sally will also go.

(39) Sally will even go.

(40) *Sally will go itself.

The second thing which suggests the grouping of J with at least also and even is the existence of a float rule, which can detach the element in question and move it to the right in a sentence. Thus (28)

can be equivalent to (27), (30) to (29), and (32) to (31). Actually (38) and (39), as well as (28) and (30), are ambiguous because of the existence of this rule. (32) is not ambiguous because there is only one place from which the herself could have come, but ambiguities can result with J in other cases.

(41) John hates Bill himself.

(42) John wants to go himself.

(41) has a reading in common with John himself hates Bill, and another in which himself applies directly to Bill. (42) has a reading in common with John himself wants to go, and another in common with John wants himself to go.

Our proposal concerning English reflexives, then is the following: that sentences like (43) have abstract structures like (44).

(43) John hates himself.

(44) *John hates John+J

(44) might be realizable as (45) under certain conditions of strong contrast, but normally the second occurrence of John will be pronominalized as in (46).

(45) ?John hates John himself.

(46) *John hates him himself.

An obligatory rule will then delete the pronoun. If we compare this with Analysis C for Japanese, the parallelism is apparent. Rule I' is the same in both languages. English lacks Rule II' and therefore Rule III'. In their place it deletes the leftmost of the two resulting forms, and does so not optionally, but obligatorily. English has a rule which Japanese lacks in the derivation of genitive noun phrases. That is, instead of John himself's, we get John's own. This can be economically stated before J is manifested as a reflexive pronoun.

Analysis D

I" Noun X Noun+J → Noun X Noun+J
[+pro]

II" Noun+J+gen → Noun+gen J

III" X +Xself → Xself
[+pro]
[+obl]

Somewhere between II" and III" we assume that the morphological nature of J is specified, since III" seems to depend in part on such structure. The feature [+obl] ('oblique') must be included because the rule never applies to nominative pronouns.

(47) He himself will go.

(48) *Himself will go.

(49) John says that he himself will go.

(50) *John says that himself will go.

There is one serious complication with III". Unlike what we found in Japanese, it does seem to have to distinguish pronouns which have antecedents from those which don't.

(51) *I hate me myself.

(52) I hate myself.

(53) ?John hates me myself.

(54) *John hates myself.

III" obligatorily turns (51) into (52). In the case of (53), it is perhaps not clear whether the sentence is entirely acceptable or not, but in any case (54), which would result from applying III" is totally out.

Arguments for this analysis are not easy to find in English. We will consider two, neither of which we find overwhelming. The first concerns the distribution of J.

(55) ?John himself hates himself.

(56) *John hates himself himself.

In (55), we get the same awkwardness we noted for (33) and (36). This follows if (55) comes from John himself hates John himself, but needs at best an ad hoc statement if (55) comes from John himself hates John. (56) is totally out. This follows if any J with the second John is required for the first reflexive pronoun; then there is nowhere the second reflexive pronoun could have come from. It will require an additional ad hoc statement to rule out the abstract structure John hates John himself in the usual analysis.

Our second argument has to do with complement structures of the sort illustrated in (42).

(57) John wants to go.

(58) John wants himself to go.

(59) *John wants [John go]

(60) *John wants [John himself go]

(61) John wants Bill to go.

(62) John wants Bill himself to go.

The usual account of (57) and (58) derives them both from an abstract structure like (59). Two rules may apply to (59): a rule which raises the complement subject into matrix object position, and a rule which deletes the complement subject. We need the raising rule independently of the reflexive cases for examples like (61), and we need the deletion rule for (57), where no complement subject remains in the surface structure. In standard English, raising is obligatory; otherwise (63) would result.

(63) *John wants that Bill go.

If we order deletion first, and make it optional, and furthermore arrange to be able to reflexivize after raising, then (58) seems accounted for.

In our analysis, we derive (57) from (59), and (58) from (60). Then there is no need to exclude (60) as a well formed abstract structure ((62) suggests that this would be incorrect), and deletion can be obligatory. Best of all, the semantic distinction between (57) and (58) is naturally accounted for. Unfortunately, the facts represented in (57) through (63) are not the only paradigm; with other verbs, there is a different pattern.

(64) John believes that he is strong.

(65) John believes himself to be strong.

(66) *John believes to be strong.

(67) John believes him to be strong.

(68) John believes that Bill is strong.

(69) John believes that Bill himself is strong.

(70) John believes Bill to be strong.

(71) John believes Bill himself to be strong.

The deletion rule does not apply to complements of <u>believe</u>, as (66) shows. The raising rule does, as (70) and (71) show, but optionally,

as (68) and (69) show. J is attachable to the complement subject, as (69) and (71) show. In this case, we cannot treat (65) as a deleted version of (69) with John replacing Bill. It must instead be derived through raising and III" applied to that structure. This weakens the force of our earlier argument, and raises a second serious complication. Since (67) cannot be understood reflexively, we will have to restrict the operation of raising to complement subjects with J just in case they are coreferential to the matrix subject. J is irrelevant in (71).

We are undecided whether the advantages of our analysis are sufficient to outweigh its problems. In either case, generalizations seem to be lost. But we think we have demonstrated that reflexives and J are not unrelated in English any more than in Japanese, and our proposal begins to account for this relationship, which the usual approach ignores. The interesting question, of course, is whether such a relationship is universal; we have seen it so far in two unrelated languages of otherwise rather different structures. It does seem that other languages we have looked at, though they may employ very different morphological apparatus, tend to show such a relationship. In Spanish, for example, J is realized with a form of mismo 'same'.[9]

(72) Su madre misma lo ha dicho.
his mother same it has said
His mother herself said it.

The same word appears in strongly contrastive reflexive constructions.

(73) Nos hemos perdido a nosotros mismos.
us we-have ruined us same
We have ruined ourselves.

It is at least plausible that (73) represents the abstract structure of all Spanish reflexives, though extensive deletion occurs normally. In any event, the matter is worth looking into in more detail in a wide variety of languages.

NOTES

[1]This paper originated as part of a longer study of deletion by Hirakouji. Thus the conclusions and principal arguments are his. Some of the details (particularly in the English portion) and the final structure and text of the paper are due to Bedell.

[2]Kuroda's dissertation contained the first detailed account of Japanese reflexivization in a transformational framework. Very recently a good deal of additional work has been done on the subject, much of which we have not seen. It seems, however, that the problems investigated there are independent of the present paper.

[3]P. 141.

[4]In subsequent discussion, Kuroda makes Rule IV optional in certain cases. This is one of them.

[5]Actually, he seems to have had in mind the framework in Chomsky (1965), but the difference is irrelevant to our point.

[6]The final set of conditions on Kuroda's Rule IV includes cases of obligatory reflexivization in subordinate clauses. Recently this analysis has been challenged by Kuno (1972). We are as yet unclear whether his account is compatible with ours or not.

[7]It seems to us that this analysis has been around for some time, though we have been unable to discover it in the literature. If it turns out to be a straw man, we are not dismayed.

[8]Published under the title "Attachment transformations" in Reibel and Schane (1969).

[9]Examples (72) and (73) are taken from Ramsey (1956), p. 89.

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